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This paper looks at the impact of networks on international migration flows to OECD 
countries. In particular, we look at whether diaspora effects are different across education 
levels and gender. Using new data allowing to include both dimensions, we are able to 
analyze the respective impact of networks on the proportion of each category of migrant. 
Therefore, unlike the preceding literature on macro determinants of international migration, 
we can identify the respective factors influencing the selection in terms skills and in term of 
gender. We found that network effects vary by education level but not by gender. Women are 
also found to be less directly dependent on migration costs unrelated to networks such as 
distance. 
JEL-Code: F22, O15. 
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Migrants’ networks have been found to exert important economic eﬀects. Networks favour
further migration of people, movement of goods, capital, and ideas across national borders
is enhanced (see Rauch and Casella, 1998, Rauch and Trindade, 2002, Munshi, 2003,
Rauch, 2003, Gao, 2003, Rapoport and Kugler, 2006, Docquier and Lodigiani, 2008).
The stock of people born in the same country and living abroad is indeed able to generate
among other things a preferential path for future migrants of the same origin through the
decrease of migration costs (either economic and psychological) and tends to overshadow
the role of traditional covariates (Massey, 1993). There exists an extensive literature in
sociology and economics on migrants’networks. This paper is related to a set of diﬀerent
strands of the extensive literature concerned by the role of migrants’ networks.
The interaction between networks and education has been recently addressed in a set
of papers. For instance, Beine et al. (2009) look at the role of migrants’ diasporas for
migration patterns by focusing on the educational level of the migrants. Network eﬀects
have been found to be more important for less skilled workers (McKenzie and Rapoport,
2007) and crucial in terms of skill composition of further migration ﬂows (Beine et al.
2009).
Another strand of the literature has looked at the impact of traditional determinants
(including networks) on female international migration. Females have been found to be
aﬀected mainly through family reuniﬁcation (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1986; Davis and Win-
ters, 2001). Basically, diasporas exert two eﬀects: it reduces migration costs (the so-called
network eﬀects) and increase the probability of migration through family reuniﬁcation.
As Boyd (1989) emphasizes, it is important to disentangle both eﬀects. Nevertheless,
the literature so far has been silent about that. Female migration in general has been
extensively addressed in a micro context and in case studies.1 2 Females are found to
be more sensitive to migration costs than men and less willing to leave their country of
origin or their family. Curran and Rivero Fuentes, 2003 ﬁnd that female migrants are
more sensitive to networks than male. Some sociological literature (Mahler and Pessar,
2006; Hondagneu-Sotelo,1994; Wiltshire, 1992; Diner, 1983) has justiﬁed that result in
terms of ‘female biological vulnerability’ (some natural risk aversion concerning migration
decisions) and it has led some researchers to consider females just as ’male migrants de-
1There are nevertheless a few exceptions in the macro literature such as Dumont, Martin and Spielvogel
(2007); Morrison, Schiﬀ and Sjoblom (2007).
2One drawback of micro-econometric analyses using individual data is that they often consider a single
destination while at the individual level the choice of destination is also important. A macroeconomic
analysis considering both the migration decision and the choice of destination is important to capture
the impact of important determinants such as the network.
2pendent’ (as wives, mothers or daughters of male migrants).3 On the other hand, genetic
evidence has questioned this explanation by documenting a higher female migration rate
for humans (Seielstad, Minch and Cavalli-Sforza, 1998). If this last ﬁnding turns out to be
true, speciﬁc economic concerns would arise with the feminization of international migra-
tion. Many studies have indeed emphasized the role of females on economic development,
and in particular that of educated females on the human capital transmission4. In sum,
societies that have a preference for not investing in girls or that lose a high proportion of
skilled women through emigration may experience slower growth and reduced income.
Finally, another strand of literature, the one concerning migrants’ selection, has dealt with
the complex mix of self-selection factors (wage diﬀerentials, probability to ﬁnd a job, wel-
fare programs and amenities, migration costs, etc.) and out-selection factors (immigration
policies at destination, mobility agreements, etc.) that shape various characteristics of
the migration ﬂows (see Grogger and Hanson , 2009; Cohen and Razin, 2008). The gender
dimension of the migrants has nevertheless not been considered (except in Cobb-Clark,
1993 as far as wage diﬀerentials are concerned).
In this paper, we aim to reconcile those diﬀerent strands of the existing literatuure. To this
aim, we consider explicitly the gender dimension, and we analyse whether the sensitiveness
to the above self-selection factors is a matter of education or gender. Integrating jointly in
the analysis the gender and the educational dimensions of international migration is likely
to be important to assess the respective impact of networks (and other determinants) on
migration ﬂows. For instance, analyzes failing to account for the educational level of
the migrants might reach misleading conclusions regarding the impact of network on
men and women if the skill composition and the gender composition are correlated. For
instance, as female migrants from most developing countries are less educated than males5
(reﬂecting thereby diﬀerences in the human capital levels among natives), one will tend
to spuriously ascribe a role for gender in female migration while the eﬀect is primarily
related to education. In a recent paper, Docquier et al. (2008) look at the propensity to
migrate for skilled women and men. They show that this propensity is not diﬀerent but
that women are more willing to follow the spouse than men. They do not look however
at network eﬀects.
The importance of considering both dimensions of migration is particular strong if for
some country pairs, migration ﬂows are highly unbalanced between men and women on
3Exceptions are Zlotnik (1990, 1995), Cobb-Clark (1993), Cerrutti and Massey (2001) or, more re-
cently, Morrison et al. (2007)
4See for example Blackden et al. (2006), Coulombe and Tremblay (2006), Klasen (1999), Knowles et
al. (2002), Dollar and Gatti (1999)
5See Unesco, 2008
3the one hand, and between skilled and unskilled workers on the other hand. The data
regarding international migration indeed suggest that there is a huge variability of the
gender and the skill composition of the migrant’s network. To illustrate, for the year 2000,
considering only diasporas larger than 1000 migrants (in order to get rid of outliers), the
standard deviation of the share of men in the diaspora is 0.124. Interestingly, the share
of men ranges from 5.8 percent to 97.5 percent.6 Regarding the skill composition of
the diasporas (captured by the share of migrants with tertiary education, the variability
is even higher: the standard deviation amounts to 0.20 and the range is between 0.6
percent and 96.4 percent. Such a high variability reﬂects of course the level of human
capital in the origin countries, but also the various factors shaping the skill composition
of the migration ﬂows and the extent to which the migrants are positively and negatively
selected. Furthermore, for developing countries, the skill composition of the diaspora and
of the migration ﬂows is (negatively) correlated with the proportion of women as women
tend to be less educated than men, at least in developing countries.
In this paper, we analyze the sensitiveness of each type of migrants to networks. To this
aim, we use a new release of the well-known dataset of Docquier and Marfouk (2006)
on international migration stocks by educational level and by gender. This allows us to
compare the sensitivity of female migrants with the one of men accounting for the level of
education. We ﬁnd that diﬀerences in network elasticities are only due to education and
not to gender. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that women are less sensitive to traditional
determinants of international migration such as distance
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main determinants of mi-
gration and the selection of migrants. Section 3 presents the data used in the paper
while section 4 presents the econometric framework and the empirical results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
In order to isolate the impact of education and gender on the pattern of international
migration, it is important to rely on a theoretical framework taking into account the mi-
gration decision and the choice of destination for each type of agent. Those decisions have
been modeled in the income-maximisation framework initially developed byRoy (1951)
and Borjas (1987) and recently extended by Grogger and Hanson (2009) and Beine et
6For instance, one sees that most of the migrants coming from Thailand or the Philippines to some
European countries such as Switzerland, Sweden and Norway are females (see Kremer and Watt, 2006
on this). This is related to migration for the sake of home production. At the other side of the gender
spectrum, most migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh in countries such as Spain or Greece are men.
4al. (2009). In those models, the decision rule of each potential migration involves the
computation of the net gains associated to each possible outcome. The possible outcomes
include the no migration outcome and any international destination. As a result, each
individual either chooses to stay in his/her origin country or decides to migrate to the
most proﬁtable destination country. In this paper and in line with this theoretical litera-
ture, we start from small theoretical model proposed by Beine et al. (2009) in which we
introduce the gender dimension. Since the whole structure is similar to the one of Beine
et al. (2009), we just summarize the main elements here.
We consider a model of migration with a single skill type in order to model the eﬀects
of diasporas. A worker of gender g endowed with h units of human capital earns a wage
wih in country i where wi is the skill price in that country. We assume absence of wage
discrimination between men and women. The individual utility is linear in income but
also depends on possible moving costs and characteristics of the country of residence. The
utility of an individual of gender g and education level h born in country i and staying in
country i is given by:
uii,g(h) = wih + Ai,g + εi,g
where Ai,g denotes country i’s characteristics (amenities, public expenditures, climate,
etc.) that can be gender speciﬁc. εi,g is a iid extreme-value distributed random term.
The utility obtained when the same person migrates to country j is given by
uij,g(h) = wjh + Aj,g − Cij,g(.) − Vij(.) + εj,g
The migration costs are divided into two categories. Cij,g captures moving and assim-
ilation costs that are supported by the migrants. These include transportation costs,
expenditures to learn a new language, etc ... . Those costs are gender speciﬁc in the
sense that men and women can have diﬀerent sensitivities to determinants of those costs,
for instance to the size of the network or to distance. Vij represents policy induced costs
borne by the migrant to overcome the legal hurdles set by the destination country’s gov-
ernment’s policies. These costs include visa fees, the bureaucratic barriers for citizenship
or even the amount paid to smugglers above the normal cost of transportation when le-
gal entry is restricted. They both depend on the existing diaspora networks and human
capital level of the migrant as explained below. The main motivation to diﬀerentiate be-
tween these two types of costs is to identify the role of government’s policy on migration
ﬂows and characteristics. The visa costs are not gender speciﬁc, as migration policies,
either through the selective policies or through the family reuniﬁcation programs do not
discriminate between men and women.
Migration costs, Cij,g, depend on factors such as physical distance (di,j), destination and
origin countries’ social, cultural and linguistic characteristics (xi,yj) as well as human
5capital level (h) of the migrant and the size of the diaspora abroad (Mi,j). Thus, we write
Cij,g(h) = cg(dij,Mij,xi,yj;h) (1)
Distance has a positive eﬀect on migration costs, i.e.
∂Cij,g
∂dij > 0. Nevertheless, the
sensitivity might depend on the gender if women pays attention to other factors such
as security or discrimination. Because social networks lower information, assimilation
and adaptation costs, diaspora has a positive eﬀect on migration through the decrease in
migration costs, i.e.
∂Cij,g
∂Mij < 0. Finally, we assume that the advantages of being skilled
are likely to be more important when the diaspora size is small and migrants can not rely




The legal (or the visa) costs, Vij, are determined by the destination country j’s govern-
ment’s policies and depend on various factors. These policies can be speciﬁc to sending
country i or depend on some individual characteristics of the migrants such as the educa-
tion level but not on the gender. Many destination countries have speciﬁc programs for
family reuniﬁcation or for highly skilled individuals.
Diasporas aﬀect the visa costs mainly through family reuniﬁcation programs. Let fj
denote the generosity of the family reuniﬁcation program of country j which generally
does not discriminate between diﬀerent origin countries. The probability that a potential
migrant from country i has a relative in country j is an increasing function of Mij/Ni
where Ni is the size of the population in country i. Thus, the overall eﬀect of reuniﬁcation
programs on visa costs depends on the expression
fjMij
Ni .
The migrant’s human capital level also aﬀects the visa costs if there are selective immi-
gration programs such as the H1-B Visa in the US or the points systems implemented in
countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand or more recently the UK. We denote the
generosity of economic migration programs as ej and the overall eﬀect of human capital on
visa costs depends on ejh. Finally, we formalize the presence of free mobility agreements
(such as those between EU members) through a dummy variable bij which is equal to one
if an agreement exists. As a result, we deﬁne visa costs as











∂e < 0 and
∂V 2
ij
∂e∂f > 0. This last term captures that the extent to which an individual
relies on family reunion program decreases (resp. increases) when economic program
becomes more (resp. less) generous or vice versa.
6In this model, the eﬀect of human capital on visa costs also depends on the size of the
diaspora. When the diaspora size is bigger, the probability that a migrant relies on
an economic migration program declines and the probability he relies on family reunion
programs increases. Hence, we have:
∂ (∂Vij/∂h)
∂Mij







Assuming the random term εj,g follows an iid extreme-value distribution, one can get the
migration ﬂow of individuals of education h and gender g from country i to country j as













We focus on our main research interest, i.e the diaspora eﬀects on the structure of mi-
gration ﬂows. First, from (3), a large diaspora in destination j unambiguously increases












) > 0 (4)
The overall impact depends on the eﬀect of networks on migration costs
∂Cij,g
∂Mij and on the
generosity of family reunion programs (fj) together with the eﬀect on visa costs
∂Vij
∂f ).
Second, we show that a larger diaspora in country j reduces the ’positive selection’ of














Diasporas exert higher eﬀects on the ﬂows of unskilled workers for two reasons : ﬁrst,
in line with the existing literature (see McKenzie and Rapoport, 2009), the decrease in
migration costs is larger for unskilled workers and second, diasporas favour family reuni-
ﬁcation processes that are more important for unskilled workers. As a result, diasporas
should increase (resp. decrease) the proportion of unskilled (resp. skilled) migrants at
destination.
Third, we can use equation (5) to identify the possible sources of divergence in the sensitiv-
ities to network between men and women. Since the second term of equation (5) capturing
7the migration policy part is not gender speciﬁc, any diﬀerence of the impact of diasporas
on the proportion of female and males for a given education level will reﬂect diﬀerences












equation (5) makes clear that accounting for the education level is of primary importance
to test for diﬀerences between men and women since both the impact of the network on
migration costs and on the family reuniﬁcation process depends on the education level.
It is useful to summarize a set of testable predictions. First, through the decrease in
migration costs and the family reuniﬁcation channel, existing networks should favor the
international migration of workers. Nevertheless, the impact should be bigger for skilled
vs unskilled workers. This implies that the network sensitivities should be negative (resp.
positive) on the proportion of skilled (resp. unskilled) migrants. Second, starting from
this, it is possible to test, for each education level, whether those sensitivities diﬀer be-
tween men and women. Given that the migration policy does not discriminate between
men and women, any diﬀerence in the estimated sensitivities can be ascribed to the impact
of diaspora on migration costs.
In section 4, we focus on the impact of network on the proportion of new migrants and
test whether those network sensitivities depend, for a given education level, on the gender.
3 The Data
This paper relies on the bilateral version of the database described in Docquier, Lowell
and Marfouk (2009), henceforth labeled DLM. This data set characterizes the gender
composition of skilled and unskilled migration of all the world countries to the OECD
in 1990 and 2000. It is based on immigration data collected in host countries, where
information about country of birth, gender, age and educational attainment of immigrants
is available. This information is found in national population censuses and registers (or
samples of them). More precisely, DLM collected gender-disaggregated data from the
30 members of the OECD, with the highest level of detail on birth countries and three
levels of educational attainment: h = u for immigrants with upper-secondary education,
h = s for those with post-secondary education and h = l for those with less than upper-
secondary education (including lower-secondary, primary and no schooling). Let M
i,j
t,g,h
denotes the stock of adults aged 25+ born in country i and living in country j at time t,
of gender g and skill h.7 Collecting these numbers in the destination country j gives the
7As suggested by Beine et al. (2007), we use migration stocks including people ageg 25 or more at
time of arrival rather than the total stock of foreign born. The idea is that it allows to include only











For each combination of gender and education level, we can deﬁne the share of the ﬂow
of migrants of gender g and education h from i to j over the period ranging from t−1 to















Given that we have observations of stocks for 1990 and 2000, we can compute ﬂows and
their proportions by category for one single period. The regressand and the main regressor
of interest, i.e. the share of each type of migrant by education level and gender and the
diaspora networks have been computed by the authors using the above indexes according
to proper calculations. Actually, it is more convenient to work with two skill levels. In the
benchmark estimations and in line with the existing literature, we consider that skilled
agents are those with tertiary education only. Nevertheless, in the robustness analysis,
we test the sensitivity of our results to this classiﬁcation.
In the following section, we relate the migration ﬂows to their determinants. Those de-
terminants include the total initial stock of migrants M
ij
t (observed in 1990), as well as
bilateral variables that are thought to inluence Cij,g,h, i.e. the (unobserved) cost sup-
ported by one migrants of gender g and education level h to migrate from country i to
country j. These variables include geodesic distance, colonial links, linguistic proximity
and the existence of the shengen agreement between European countries. To deal with the
endogeneity of M
ij
t (see later), we use dummies capturing the historical implementation
of some guest worker program. In the robustness analysis, we also use data to capture
political rights of female migrants. All those data are explained in Appendix B.
4 Econometric Analysis
4.1 Benchmark Speciﬁcation
The benchmark model that we estimate is a four equation system, each equation capturing
the impact of determinants on the proportion of each category of new migrants from
migrants that have acquired their education prior to arrival.
9country i to j. More precisely, the system is deﬁned as :
S
i,j













































t,g,h is the logistic transformation of P
i,j
t,g,h, the share of the ﬂow of migrants between
1990 and 2000 coming from country i to country j of gender g and education level h.8
We consider two education levels, low and high , i.e. h = {l,u}. Highly educated workers
are those with tertiary educational achievement while less educated workers comprise
either those with post-secondary and less than upper-secondary education. The logistic
transformation allows us to rescale the dependent variables on a 0-∞ scale rather than to
work with bounded variables. This ensures a better behavior of the traditional estimates
used in the econometric analysis. Each equation includes αi,gh and αj,gh ﬁxed eﬀects,
capturing the impact of unobserved factors speciﬁc to origin and destination countries.
The impact of the total diaspora is captured through the β associated to D
i,j
t−1 which is





that the network has a concave impact on the share. In addition to that, we include a
set of observable bilateral variables Zi,j
w capturing the migration costs from i to j such as
the log of distance, colonial links or the use of a common oﬃcial language. ǫ
i,j
t,g,h is the
error term of each equation while υi,j,t is a random variable capturing the inﬂuence of
additional unobserved bilateral factors inﬂuencing S
i,j
t,g,h.
8Actually, we take the logistic transformation S
i,j
t,g,h of the proportion of migrants of each type P
i,j
t,g,h.









). See Johnson (1949).
The logistic transformation allows to rescale variables deﬁned on a restricted interval such as (0,1). Those
variables have non standard distributions, J or U-shaped, that preclude classical econometric approaches
and that lead to problems of inference in ﬁnite samples. In contrast, the logistic transformation gives rise
to a logit-normal distribution. Here we take particular values for the parameters of the transformation,
with η = 0, κ = 1, a = 0 and b = 1.
10The estimation of system (8-11) allows to test whether the network sensitivities are equal
between men and women. In order terms, the key investigation involves to test the validity
of the two following null hypotheses : H0,1 : βmu = βfu and H0,2 : βml = βfl.
The use of logistic transformations allows to account for the non standard distributions
associated to the use of proportions as the dependent variables. This is important for
inference purposes that are central in this paper. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we
also estimate system (8-11) using proportions as the relevant dependent variables. This
implies a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent approach than the one adopted in the following section.
In particular, it involves constrained estimation taking into account that the proportions
of migration ﬂows sum up to 1.9 We ﬁnd similar ﬁndings with respect to the key elements
of investigation, especially concerning the non rejection of H0,1 and H0,2. The results of
that alternative analysis are reported in section 4.4 and in Appendix A1.
4.2 Econometric issues
The estimation of system (8)-(11) raises a couple of econometric issues. A ﬁrst issue is
related to the fact that the model involves proportion of migrants’ ﬂows. This induces
a signiﬁcant degree of correlation between the error terms of each equation ǫ
i,j
t,g,h. The
correlations between the S
i,j
t,g,h of each equation ranges from 0.41 to -0.70. This correlation
has to be accounted for to ensure the consistency of the parameter estimates. Therefore,
we use SURE method to estimate the system. 10
The second econometric issue is related to the need to instrument the diaspora in each of
the four equations. This issue has explicitely been addressed by Beine et al.(2009). The





t,g,h. If there are unobserved factors included in ǫ
i,j
t,g,h that are correlated
with the size of the diaspora, then failure to identify those factors will lead to some
inconsistency in the parameter estimates of (some of) the equations. For instance, some
bilateral factors related to resilient discrimination of females of country i in country j will
both inﬂuence in turn the size of the diaspora D
i,j
t−1 and the proportion of female migrants
S
i,j
t,f,h, leading to inconsistency of the parameter estimates of the equations involving female
migration. To prevent such a problem, it might be desirable to instrument D
i,j
t−1 using
instruments correlated with the size of the total diaspora in 1990 but uncorrelated to
9In contrast, when using logistic transformation of the shares, there is no explicit constraint to account
for in the estimation process.
10An explicit test assessing the relevance of the SURE estimation compared to OLS estimation strongly
supports the SURE estimates. Failure to account for the correlation between the ǫ
i,j
t,g,h leads to quite
diﬀerent results.
11migration ﬂows between 1990 and 2000.
In this paper, we use two instruments. The ﬁrst one has been proposed by Beine et al.
(2009). It captures guest workers programs implemented to attract new migrants to work
in some speciﬁc industries in the aftermath of the Second World War. These guest workers
agreements were conducted on a bilateral basis (for instance between Mexico and the US,
Italy and Belgium) and most of those came to an end during the Seventies. Therefore,
they are good predictors of the push and pull factors that led to the building of the total
diaspora observed in 1970 in a set of destination countries. Since those programs ended
in the 70’s, they are not supposed to inﬂuence the recent ﬂows of migrants.11 The second
instrument is simply the size of the total diaspora observed in 1960. This instrument
complements the use of the ﬁrst instrument to predict the diaspora observed in 1990,
especially in destination countries that did not implement any guest worker program.
The use of that instrument raises the quality of adjustment of the ﬁrst stage regression
in the IV procedure with respect to the use of the guest workers programs as a single
instrument.12 Therefore it minimizes the risk of weak instrumentation associated to the
use of a single instrument.
An additional diﬃculty is to combine SURE estimation and instrumentation. We use two
alternative methods. In the ﬁrst method, we use SURE estimation with the predicted
values of D
i,j
t−1 based on the ﬁrst stage regression involving the two instruments. As an
alternative, we can use 3-stage least squares, i.e. the estimation of the SURE system with
an additional equation which is the ﬁrst stage equation of the IV procedure. This method
has the advantage of correcting for the estimated standard errors of the parameters.
For the sake of robustness, we provide the estimation of system (8-11) using the three
alternative estimation methods : (i) SURE, (ii) SURE with predicted values of D
i,j
t−1 and
(iii) 3-stage least squares.
4.3 Benchmark regression results
Tables 1, 2 and 3 report the results of model(8-11) for the three estimation methods.
A ﬁrst important result of the analysis is that the three alternative methods yield similar
results in many respects. First of all, we ﬁnd that the three estimation methods yield
similar estimates of the elasticity of migration shares with respect to the diaspora. The
elasticity is found to be negative for skilled migrants and positive for unskilled migrants.
This result is in line with Beine et al. (2009) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2009). Also,
11See details on that instrument in Beine et al. (2009)
12To illustrate, the F-stat of the ﬁrst stage regression involving the IV estimation of the proportion of
the ﬂow of unskilled men amounts to 50.43 with only one instrument and to 321.77 with both instruments.
12it is found that distance tends to aﬀect the proportion of skilled men vs less skilled men
while it does not aﬀect, at least in a linear way, the proportion of women of each type.
These results are found with SURE estimates, either with or without an explicit account
of the possible endogeneity of the diaspora. Therefore, while it is important to instrument
diasporas, the results are not aﬀected by the assumption regarding the correlation between
the diaspora and the error term. In contrast and not surprisingly, the results strongly
support the need to account for the correlation between error terms across the 4 equations.
Unreported results of IV estimates obtained equation by equation suggest that the results
are quite diﬀerent whether SURE is used or not. The Breusch-Pagan tests of the null
hypothesis of independent error terms across equation is strongly rejected.13
Coming to the economic interpretation of the estimates, two main comments are in or-
der. First, sensitivities of the migrants’ proportion to the diaspora are strikingly diﬀerent
across education levels. Actually, in line with the existing literature, we ﬁnd that networks
favor the migration of less skilled rather than skilled migrants. Diasporas are therefore a
strong selection device. Interestingly, diaspora eﬀects do not seem to diﬀer between gen-
ders for the same education level: less skilled (resp. skilled) women seem to be aﬀected
in the same way as less skilled (resp. skilled) men by the presence of a diaspora. In other
terms, the estimation results support the validity of H0,1 and H0,2. As rationalized in the
theoretical background, the diaspora eﬀect might be disentangled into a component re-
lated to migration policy (the family reuniﬁcation channel) and the impact of the network
on migration costs. Since migration policy is not gender speciﬁc, we ﬁnd that the impact
on migration costs does not diﬀer across genders. This contrasts with some ﬁndings of the
existing literature such as those of Davis and Winters (2001) or Curran and Rivero-Fuente
(2003). This suggests that failure to account for diﬀerences of educational level across
genders might lead to misleading results regarding the diﬀerence of sensitivities to some
determinants of international migration between women and men. In order to further
strengthen this statement, Table 4 reports the results of an explicit testing procedure
on the diaspora elasticities. The null hypotheses is that for a given education level, the
diaspora elasticities are equal between men and women. For all the estimation methods
and for both education levels, we ﬁnd that the null hypotheses hypothesis cannot be re-
jected. Estimated p-values are well above the usual signiﬁcance levels, even when using
conservative ones.
13Note that since we use logistic transformations of the proportion of each category of migrants, we do
not have to account for the explicit constraints that proportions of migrants sum up to 1.
13Table 1. SURE Estimation of diaspora eﬀects
unskilledMAL skilledMAL skilledFEM unskilledFEM
ldiasp 0.049*** -0.082*** -0.101*** 0.0589***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
ldist -0.100*** 0.095*** 0.028 -0.015
(0.0354) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034)
colony 0.061 0.024 -0.047 0.070
(0.094) (0.085) (0.085) (0.091)
comlang oﬀ -0.249*** 0.206*** 0.253*** -0.119***
(0.061) (0.055) (0.055) (0.059)
shengen -0.364*** 0.770*** 0.562*** -0.512***
(0.126) (0.115) (0.115) (0.122)
origin FE yes yes yes yes
destination FE yes yes yes yes
Obs 2389 2389 2389 2389
RMSE 0.738 0.672 0.671 0.716
Chi2 1639.58 2118.12 3154.68 1652.71
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.4070 0.4699 0.5691 0.4089
Breusch-Pagan test:
chi2(6) = 2123.37 ( 0.00)
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Standard errors in par.
14Table 2. Combined SURE and IV estimation of diaspora eﬀects
unskilledMAL skilledMAL skilledFEM unskilledFEM
ldiasp 0.043* -0.096*** -0.111*** 0.086***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
ldist -0.097** 0.078* 0.020 0.014
(0.043) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042)
colony 0.079 0.033 -0.072 0.039
(0.096) (0.088) (0.088) (0.093)
comlang oﬀ -0.245*** 0.200*** 0.259*** -0.120***
(0.061) (0.055) (0.055) (0.059)
shengen -0.326*** 0.718*** 0.525*** -0.480***
(0.121) (0.110) (0.111) (0.117)
origin FE yes yes yes yes
destination FE yes yes yes yes
Obs 2471 2471 2471 2471
RMSE 0.741 0.677 0.678 0.718
Chi2 1616.37 2079.81 3069.71 1638.54
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.3955 0.4570 0.5540 0.3987
Breusch-Pagan test:
chi2(6) = 2279.14 ( 0.00)
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Standard errors in par.
15Table 3. Three Stage Least Squares estimation of diaspora
unskilledMAL skilledMAL skilledFEM unskilledFEM
ldiasp 0.054* -0.104*** -0.121*** 0.100***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
ldist -0.094** 0.069* 0.003 0.035
(0.046) (0.042) (0.042) (0.045)
colony 0.054 0.056 -0.017 0.006
(0.101) (0.092) (0.092) (0.098)
comlang oﬀ -0.252*** 0.218*** 0.264*** -0.143**
(0.062) (0.057) (0.057) (0.061)
shengen -0.364*** 0.774*** 0.566*** -0.521***
(0.126) (0.115) (0.115) (0.123)
origin FE yes yes yes yes
destination FE yes yes yes yes
Obs 2389 2389 2389 2389
RMSE 0.738 0.672 0.672 0.719
Chi2 1623.56 2065.29 3073.88 1627.34
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.4069 0.4690 0.5684 0.4052
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Standard errors in par.
Table 4. Testing for diﬀerent diaspora elasticities across gender
SURE SURE (IV) 3SLS
Skilled 0,25 0,37 0,38
Unskilled 0,36 0,27 0,27
p-value of test reported in the table
null hypothesis:equal diaspora elasticities
Another interesting ﬁnding concerns the sensitivity to distance. Distance is a good proxy
here for the variables aﬀecting directly migration costs and those unrelated to networks.
For all estimation methods, we ﬁnd that distance is a powerful selection device in terms of
skills for men. This results is in line with the existing macro literature (Beine et al., 2009).
16Nevertheless, we do not ﬁnd any eﬀect of distance for women, whether educated or not.
This suggests that in the choice of destination, other determinants will aﬀect women’s
choice so that those determinants will undermine a linear relationship between migration
choices and distance. Of course, this does not mean that distance will not aﬀect the choice
of destination for women in an unconditional way however. Nevertheless, in some cases,
distance will not be the driving force of the migration choice of women. Factors such
as security at destination or lack of discrimination against women at destination might
lead to other preferred choices.14 Such a result is in line with the concept of biological
vulnerability associated to female migration (see Lim and Oishi, 1996; Phizacklea, 1983).
Regarding the other variables, we ﬁnd that colonial links do not aﬀect migration ﬂows
or their composition. This result is in line with those obtained by Beine et al. (2009).
Colonial links are indeed very related to the existing diaspora. Those links played an
important role in the past, after the acquisition of independence obtained by a lot of
developing countries in the 50’s and 60’s. Their impact on the initial migration ﬂows is
not to question. As time passes by, most new migrants are more aﬀected by the existing
diaspora rather than past colonial links. In other words, this can explain why colonial
links have strong predictive power in stock models (Grogger and Hanson, 2009) but not
in ﬂow models accounting for the diaspora eﬀects like ours.
Second, we ﬁnd that a common oﬃcial language tends to raise the proportion of skilled
migrants at the expense of less skilled ones. This holds for women and men. This result is
in line with the transferability of skills hypothesis (Chiswick, 1979; Chiswick and Miller,
2007). Linguistic proﬁciency is mostly needed in skilled rather than unskilled professional
occupations. This is in line with the estimation results of Beine et al. (2009). Our results
show that this eﬀect holds regardless the gender of the new migrants.
Third, we ﬁnd that the Shengen agreement is associated with skilled migration. This
result should be interpreted with caution. Shengen agreement applies only to wealthy
European countries and therefore might be seen also as a proxy of migration between rich
countries. It reﬂects the fact that the free migration regime within the European Union
favored the mobility of skilled rather than less skilled people.
14For instance, suppose that a European woman has the choice between migration to some (seemingly)
dangerous US city and some (seemingly) safe Australian city, with other similar determinants (wages,
amenities, job opportunities) between the two destinations. It might be the case that in spite of the
additional migration cost, this woman might favour the Australian destination for security concerns.
174.4 Robustness Checks
4.4.1 Instrumentation
In the previous estimation procedure, we paid attention to the possible correlation between
the existing diaspora and the error term. This potential correlation is due to the failure
to account for the inﬂuence of some unobservable bilateral factors aﬀecting the stock and
the ﬂows of migrants. As a result, we instrumented the existing diaspora, using the stock
of migrants in 1960 and the dummy for guest workers programs implemented after WW2.
Actually, those instruments might be considered on a theoretical basis as truly exogenous
instruments with respect to the migration ﬂows between 1990 and 2000. Nevertheless, the
Hansen overidentiﬁcation test of the IV regressions suggests that some correlations might
be too high. The last row of Table 5 reports the results for the overidentication tests The
p-values of the Hansen overidentiﬁcation tests in the 4 equations (the null hypothesis being
zero correlation between the instruments and the error term are respectively 0.43, 0.00,
0.08 and 0.09. This suggests that the use of the 2 instruments is potentially misleading
for the estimation of the proportion of skilled men.15 This might shed some doubt on the
results of the IV and 3SLS estimation procedures. In order to test the robustness of the
results, we also consider 3SLS estimation with only one instrument, namely the size of
the diaspora in 1960. The results over the exactly identiﬁed setting are reported in Table
6 in Appendix A. Not surprisingly, the F-test of the ﬁrst stage equation suggest that this
instrument is a strong instrument of the diaspora.
Two comments are in order. First, the results regarding the eﬀects of the diaspora are
very similar with respects to those obtained with two instruments. We observe the same
pattern in the results, i.e. the positive impact for less skilled migrants and the negative
impact on the proportion of skilled migrants. Furthermore, like in the benchmark results
with two instruments, we do not ﬁnd diﬀerent sensitivities between women and men for a
given education level, although the diﬀerence in the elasticities between unskilled men and
unskilled women tends to slightly increase. Second, with respect to distance, our main
ﬁnding remains valid, although in a less strong way. We ﬁnd that female migration choices
are not directly aﬀected by distance. For men, we ﬁnd a strong negative relationship for
unskilled migrants. The positive impact of distance on the proportion of skilled male
migrants becomes insigniﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
15Actually, the overidentiﬁcation test of the IV regressions is an indirect test of the relevance of the
instruments in the 3SLS estimations since the IV procedure is strongly rejected due to correlation between
the error terms of the 4 equations. Nevertheless, we use them as a criterion for the validity of our
instrument set with respect to the exclusion restrictions.
18Table 5. Testing for the quality of instruments in the overidentiﬁed setting
Endogenous variable:
lagged diaspora
unskilled MAL skilled MAL unskilled FEM skilled FEM
First Stage F-stat 261.98 295.28 259.07 264.29
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Kleibergen-Paap stat. 261.979 295.276 259.074 264.289
Hansen J statistic 0.602 17.372 2.877 7.054
P-value (0.438) (0.00) (0.08) (0.09)
4.4.2 Analyzing proportions
In the benchmark regression analysis, we have so far used logistic transformations of the
proportions of each type of migrants. As emphasized before, the logistic transformation
allows to account for the non standard distributions associated to bounded variables such
as the proportions. Nevertheless, since our theoretical framework yields predictions in
terms of proportions rather their logistic transforms, it might be desirable to carry out
a similar statistical analysis in order to assess the inﬂuence of logistic transformation on
the key results. This implies to reestimate model (8-11) using P
i,j
t,g,h rather than S
i,j
t,g,h.
Using proportions rather their logistic transformations implies a diﬀerent estimation strat-
egy. In that case, unlike with logistic transforms, one has to account for the fact that
the sum of P
i,j
t,g,h is equal to one. This constraint has to be accounted for in the estima-
tion strategy. This problem has been tackled in the estimation of almost ideal demand
system (AIDS) in which the determinants of expenditures shares are investigated (see for
instance Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). Basically, this implies to leave out the fourth
equation and to recover the elasticities of the fourth equation as a residual outcome from
the constraint. The choice of the equation left out of the estimation is irrelevant. More
speciﬁcally, the constraint implies that βml + βfl + βmu + βfu = 0.
Appendix A1 report the estimation of the system estimated on proportions. Each table
presnet the results leaving out one particular equation. The results are obtained using
3SLS estimation with the same set of instruments as in the benchmark estimation. From
Tables 6-9, we conduct wald tests on the two key hypothesis, namely H0,1 : βmu = βfu and
H0,2 : βml = βfl. We fail to reject both hypothesis at conventional signiﬁcance levels. The
p-value associated to the ﬁrst hypothesis involving skilled migrants amounts to 0.78. The
corresponding p-value for the second hypothesis involving unskilled migrants amounts to
190.27. This supports the robustness of our results obtained on the logistic transformations
of the proportions of migration ﬂows.
4.4.3 Female speciﬁc determinants
The previous results regarding the impact of distance suggest that other speciﬁc deter-
minants might aﬀect the migration choices of women. In this section we introduce some
potential female speciﬁc determinants in equations governing female migration. Since our
regressions include ﬁxed eﬀects for origins and destinations, it is important to notice that
additional determinants have to be bilateral. Factors related to the stance of discrimi-
nation or security levels in the destination country are already implicitly captured in the
regression. This allows to assess the robustness of our previous results.
We consider the following variable thought to assess the attractiveness of the destination
(with respect to the origin country) in terms of female political rights. We build a variable
based on the year in which women were allowed to vote for the ﬁrst time at destination
and at the origin. We take the diﬀerence between the year at destination and at origin.
Therefore, a lower value indicates that the destination country is more progressive towards
female political rights, compared to the origin country16.
The estimation results are reported in Appendix A. We ﬁnd that the more progressive
is the destination compared to the origin, the higher is the proportion of skilled female
and the lower is the proportion of less skilled females. This result is consistent with the
fact that skilled migrants are more involved in political activities and more interested by
political representation or participation than less skilled migrants. Also, extending the
speciﬁcation with this additional determinant does not change the main pattern of the
results: (i) diaspora eﬀects are diﬀerent across education levels but not across gender
and (ii) distance aﬀects male migration choices but not those of women, regardless the
education level.17
16This indicator is in line with the level of democracy of the country. The correlation between the
diﬀerence in female suﬀrage and democratic attainment is negative and equal to 0,2824. Data for democ-
racy are from Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. (2003). ‘ Governance Matters III: Governance
Indicators for 1996–2002.’ Policy Research Working Paper 3106. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
17The main results are also conﬁrmed using an adjusted value of the ratio in female suﬀrage. This
adjustment account for cases where women are theoretically supposed to have been able to vote for a
long time while the general level of democracy is obviously low. For those countries, there is thus a high
level of discrepancy between theoretical and practical rights. To correct for that, we proceeded according
to the following steps. We ﬁrst identiﬁed those presumably critical countries for which the year in which
females started to vote is too ‘low’ (i.e. less recent in terms of time) with respect to the level of democracy
(i.e. Afghanistan, Burma, Cuba, Hong Kong, Macao, East Timor, Equatorial Guinea, Iraq, Israel, Libya,
Nauru, Sudan, Syria, Turkemenistan, Tuvalu). We then replaced the suﬀrage ratios belonging to those
204.4.4 Educational and gender structure of the diaspora
So far, we have assumed that the impact of the diaspora is the same regardless of its
structure. Two types of characteristics might be considered. In line with the microecono-
metric literature on the impact of migration network, a ﬁrst type of structure concerns the
proportion of women and men in the existing diaspora. For instance Davis and Winters
(2001) show that female networks have a strong inﬂuence on the choice of female migrants
in terms of the destination. Curran and Rivero-Fuentes (2003) ﬁnd support in favour of
symmetric eﬀects in terms of gender , i.e. female (resp. male) networks aﬀecting more
female (resp. male) migration.
The second feature is the skill composition of the diaspora. It might be the case that
the skill composition of the diaspora will aﬀect the impact of such diaspora in terms
of decreased migration costs. For instance, skilled migrants might provide more precise
information to new migrants in terms of administrative procedures, job opportunities, ...
In turn, this impact might be lower of higher on skilled and unskilled migrants.
One modeling approach is to break down the existing diaspora between the skilled and
unskilled parts on the one hand and/or between the female and the male components on
the other hand is one. Unfortunately, in a cross-section set-up like ours, this leads to a
very strong collinearity between the various networks, which in turn precludes a sound
estimation of the eﬀect of the diasporas. An alternative approach is to include the total
diaspora along with some ratios characterizing its composition. A ﬁrst possibility is to
augment system speciﬁcation (8-11) with the sex ratio deﬁned as the number of men
divided by the number of women in the diaspora observed in 1990. A second possibility
is to include the selection ratio as deﬁned by Grogger and Hanson (2009) and Beine
et al. (2009) which takes the ratio of skilled migrants over unskilled migrants. In line
with those authors, we take the ratio of the number of migrants with tertiary education
over the number of migrants with primary education in the diaspora observed in 1990.
Results are reported in Tables 8 and 9 in Appendix A. Table 8 gives the 3SLS estimates
of model (8-11) in which the sex ratio is introduced. Table 9 gives the same results with
the selection ratio instead of the sex ratio.
The extension of the benchmark results to the inclusion of the structure of the diaspora,
either in terms of gender or in terms of skill yields the following results. With respect to
the gender structure, we do not ﬁnd any additional impact of the gender structure on the
proportions of each category of migrants. The coeﬃcients of the sex ratio are obviously
insigniﬁcant at usual signiﬁcance levels. Furthermore, our main results remain virtually
identical compared to the benchmark regressions.
countries with the highest value (meaning higher than 1) of the original distribution.
21With respect to the skill structure, things are slightly diﬀerent. We ﬁnd that the skill
structure has an inﬂuence on the selection of migrants. We ﬁnd that the more educated
is the existing diaspora, the higher (resp.) is the proportion of skilled (resp. less skilled)
migrants. This result suggests that the network eﬀect might be higher for migrants with
the same level of education. This might be related to the fact that the informational value
of the network depends on the degree of matching between new and old migrants. This
holds regardless the gender of those migrants. Introducing the skill ratio does not change
the main results of our analysis. Nevertheless, some results are slightly diﬀerent, such
as the diaspora eﬀect on the ﬂow of unskilled male migrants which becomes insigniﬁcant
(the p-value is equal to 0.117). Nevertheless, one should take those results with some
caution. Another interpretation of the signiﬁcance of the skill ratio is that there is a case
for endogeneity of the ratio it-self. Indeed, like for the diaspora variable, the selection ratio
might be correlated with the error term through omitted variables that would jointly aﬀect
the proportions of migrants and the skill composition of the stocks. This raises the need to
instrument the ratio. However, ﬁnding suitable instruments for it is not straightforward
and beyond the scope of this paper.18
4.4.5 Alternative deﬁnition of skilled migrants
The classiﬁcation of migrants into skilled and less skilled workers rests on a choice con-
cerning the level of education above which people are considered skilled. In the brain drain
literature, skilled workers are often considered as those with tertiary education level. This
explains the choice we made in the benchmark regressions. For the sake of robustness,
one might consider another classiﬁcation, including migrants with secondary educational
achievement in the category of skilled workers instead of less skilled ones.
Table 10 in Appendix A provides the results with the alternative classiﬁcation of workers.
Skilled migrants are those with tertiary and secondary education levels while less skilled
ones are only those with primary education (or less). The results are very similar to
those obtained with the benchmark classiﬁcation in terms of skills. In particular, the
diaspora eﬀects are found to be similar across the various categories of migrants. We ﬁnd
a slightly diﬀerent result for the impact of distance in the sense that distance is not found
to aﬀect unskilled male migrants. Nevertheless, while distance is a strong selection device
for skilled men, it does not aﬀect the proportion of skilled and unskilled women, like in
our benchmark results. All in all, those ﬁndings suggest that our benchmark results are
18Actually, we tried to use the set of instruments used for the lagged diaspora. Since we have two
potential instruments, this would lead to an exactly identiﬁed setting in that case. Nevertheless, the
guest worker agreement and the stock of migrants in 1960 did not turn out to be correlated with the skill
ratio.
22robust to the deﬁnition of skilled and unskilled migrants, to the structure of the diaspora,
to the instrumentation procedure and to the introduction of speciﬁc determinants of
female migration.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the sensitivity to networks for male and female migrants.
The main contribution of this paper is that we account for both the gender and the
educational dimensions of the migrants. Failing to account for the educational attainment
of the migrants is likely to lead to problems in the identiﬁcation of factors that drive
diﬀerences in propensity to migrate if migration patterns are unbalanced. The migration
patterns might be unbalanced between men and women, between skilled and less skilled
or in both dimensions. In particular, for countries in which women are much less educated
than men, failing to account for the educational level might lead to ascribe a spurious role
to gender.
Using a new release of the Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009) database on interna-
tional migration by gender and by education attainment, we estimate the role of networks
and other determinants of migration such as distance on the proportion of each type of
migrant. In line with the recent literature, we show that networks have heterogeneous
eﬀects between skilled and unskilled migrants. In contrast, the sensitivity to network is
statistically identical between men and women for each skill level. The results are robust
to the deﬁnition of skilled workers, to the estimation technique, to the adopted speciﬁ-
cation, to the instrumentation procedure and to the structure of the diaspora it-self. In
contrast, regarding the literature on the determinants of international migration, we ﬁnd
a diﬀerent role for some other factors such as distance.
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297 Appendix A: Tables of the Robustness Analysis
7.1 Appendix A1: Estimation of the impact on proportions
Table 6 present the estimates of system (8)-(11) on proportions rather than on their logistic
transformations. This implies to leave out one of the four equations of the estimation.
Table 6-9 present the results leaving out one particular equation. Note that the results
are strictly identical regardless of the excluded equation.
Table 6. Excluding unskilled males
skilledMAL skilledFEM unskilledFEM
ldiasp -0.0086*** -0.0101*** 0.0108***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ldist 0.0171*** 0.0007 -0.0004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
colony -0.0024 -0.0111 0.0135
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
comlang oﬀ 0.0265*** 0.0253*** -0.0161*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
shengen 0.107*** 0.052*** -0.0970***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.022)
origin FE yes yes yes
destination FE yes yes yes
Obs 2389 2389 2389
RMSE 0.0915 0.0904 0.119
Chi2 2158.21 2948.31 1937.72
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.4746 0.5524 0.4478
Breusch-Pagan test:
chi2(3) = 1452.907 ( 0.00)
*
Signiﬁcant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Standard errors in par.
30Table 7. Excluding skilled males
unskilledMAL skilledFEM unskilledFEM
ldiasp 0.0079*** -0.0101*** 0.0108***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ldist -0.0174*** 0.0007 -0.0004
(0.0055) (0.004) (0.005)
colony 0.0000 -0.0111 0.013
(0.0146) (0.0115) (0.051)
comlang oﬀ -0.0358*** 0.0253*** -0.161*
(0.009) (0.074) (0.009)
shengen -0.0627*** 0.0525*** -0.097***
(0.0196) (0.154) (0.009)
origin FE yes yes yes
destination FE yes yes yes
Obs 2389 2389 2389
RMSE 0.1149 0 .0904 0.119
Chi2 1901.43 2948.31 1937.72
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.4432 0.5524 0.4478
Breusch-Pagan test:
chi2(3) = 1321.346 ( 0.00)
*
Signiﬁcant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Standard errors in par.
31Table 8. Excluding unskilled females
unskilledMAL skilledMAL skilledFEM
ldiasp 0 .0079*** -0.0086*** -0.0101***
(0.001) (0.0013) (0.0013)
ldist -0.017*** 0.0171*** 0.0007
(0.0055) (0.0043) (0.004)
colony 0.000 0.0024 -0.011
(0.014) (0.0116) (0.011)
comlang oﬀ -0.358*** 0.0206*** 0.0253***
(0.009) (0.0075) (0.007)
shengen -0.062*** 0.107*** 0.0525***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.154)
origin FE yes yes yes
destination FE yes yes yes
Obs 2389 2389 2389
RMSE 0.1149 0.0915 0.0904
Chi2 1901.43 2158.21 2948.31
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.4432 0.4746 0.5524
Breusch-Pagan test:
chi2(3) = 1327.262 ( 0.00)
*
Signiﬁcant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Standard errors in par.
32Table 9. Excluding skilled females
unskilledMAL skilledMAL unskilledFEM
ldiasp 0.0079*** -0.0086*** 0.0108***
(0.017) (0.0013) (0.0018)
ldist -0.0174*** 0.0171*** -0.0004
(0.055) (0.0043) (0.005)
colony 0.000 0.0024 0.035
(0.0146) (0.0116) (0.015)
comlang oﬀ -0.0358*** 0.0265*** -0.0161
(0.0094) (0.065) (0.009)
shengen -0.0627*** 0.107*** -0.097***
(0.0196) (0.156) (0.0203)
origin FE yes yes yes
destination FE yes yes yes
Obs 2389 2389 2389
RMSE 0.1149 0.0915 0.119
Chi2 1901.43 2158.21 1937.72
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.4432 0.4746 0.4478
Breusch-Pagan test:
chi2(6) = 1345.199 ( 0.00)
*
Signiﬁcant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Standard errors in par.
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Table 10. Exactly Identiﬁed setting
unskilledMAL skilledMAL skilledFEM unskilledFEM
ldiasp 0.048* -0.116*** -0.116*** 0.110***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025)
ldist -0.091** 0.054 0.014 0.041
(0.044) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042)
colony 0.072 0.061 -0.065 0.005
(0.097) (0.088) (0.088) (0.093)
comlang oﬀ -0.248*** 0.212*** 0.266*** -0.134**
(0.061) (0.055) (0.056) (0.059)
shengen -0.327*** 0.724*** 0.528*** -0.488***
(0.121) (0.110) (0.111) (0.117)
origin FE yes yes yes yes
destination FE yes yes yes yes
Obs 2471 2471 2471 2471
Chi2 1617.16 2091.68 3071.17 1649.61
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R-squared 0.3956 0.4584 0.5541 0.4003
F-stat ﬁrst stage: 479.39 564.27 500.08 488.71
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Breusch-Pagan test:
chi2(6) = 2271.55 (0.00)
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Standard errors in par.
34Table 11. Adding the diﬀerence in female suﬀrage
unskilledMAL skilledMAL skilledFEM unskilledFEM
ldiasp 0.061** -0.104*** -0.123*** 0.108***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
ldist -0.081* 0.069* 0.00 0.041
(0.047) (0.042) (0.042) (0.045)
colony 0.046 0.056 -0.026 0.005
(0.101) (0.092) (0.092) (0.098)
comlang oﬀ -0.257*** 0.216*** 0.266*** -0.145**
(0.062) (0.057) (0.056) (0.061)
shengen -0.370*** 0.780*** 0.595*** -0.549***
(0.126) (0.115) (0.115) (0.123)
fem suﬀrage -0.344*** 0.344***
(0.113) 0.123
origin FE yes yes yes yes
destination FE yes yes yes yes
Obs 2341 2341 2341 2341
Chi2 1591.96 2002.65 3021.36 1615.08
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R-squared 0.4069 0.4664 0.5677 0.408
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Standard errors in par.
35Table 12. Adding the gender structure of the diaspora
unskilledMAL skilledMAL skilledFEM unskilledFEM
ldiasp 0.0604** -0.101*** -0.120*** 0.1032***
(0.0263) (0.0239) (0.024) (0.0257)
ldist -0.0862* 0.0808* 0.009 0.0204
(0.0458) (0.0417) (0.0416) (0.0445)
comlang oﬀ -0.247*** 0.224* 0.264*** -0.131
(0.0628) (0.0572) (0.057) (0.0610)
shengen -0.373*** 0.782*** 0.593*** -0.557***
(0.126) (0.115) (0.115) (0.123)
sexratio -0.000 .0000 -0.000 .0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
suﬀ2 F -0.337*** 0.370***
(0.113) (0.123)
origin FE yes yes yes yes
destination FE yes yes yes yes
Obs 2322 2322 2322 2322
Chi2 1565.70 1982.83 2976.40 1594.62
p-value (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
R-squared 0.4060 0.4684 0.5676 0.4111
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Standard errors in par.
36Table 13. Adding the educational structure of the diaspora
unskilledMAL skilledMAL skilledFEM unskilledFEM
ldiasp 0.0425 -0.0826*** -0.107*** 0.089***
(0.0272) (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0267)
ldist -0.0836* 0.0950** -0.001 0.0207
(0.0461) (0.0418) (0.0418) (0.0451)
comlang oﬀ -0.1932*** 0.183*** 0.207*** -0.0876
(0.0635) (0.0576) (0.057) (0.0621)
shengen -0.344*** 0.774*** 0.560*** -0.526***
(0.125) (0.113) (0.114) (0.123)
skillratio -0.0423*** 0.0250*** 0.036*** -0.0295***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
suﬀ2 F -0.295*** 0.325***
(0.115) (0.126)
origin FE yes yes yes yes
destination FE yes yes yes yes
Obs 2303 2303 2303 2303
Chi2 1690.41 2088.97 3118.85 1610.89
p-value (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
R-squared 0.4250 0.4815 0.5804 0.4155
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Standard errors in par.
37Table 14. Alternative deﬁnition of skilled people
primaryMAL ter+secMAL tert+secFEM primaryFEM
ldiasp 0.061* -0.106*** -0.072*** 0.119***
(0.0344) (0.023) (0.0251) (0.029)
ldist -0.035 -0.076* 0.0246 0.014
(0.058) (0.039) (0.042) (0.049)
colony -0.062 0.147 -0.003 0.032
(0.13) (0.088) (0.095) (0.11)
comlang oﬀ -0.240*** 0.114** 0.218*** -0.204***
(0.082) (0.056) (0.060) (0.0700)
shengen -0.596*** 0.421*** 0.513*** -0.773***
(0.158) (0.107) (0.115) (0.133)
origin FE yes yes yes yes
destination FE yes yes yes yes
Obs 2116 2116 2116 2116
Chi2 1270.96 1579.37 2031.66 1717.25
p-value (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
R-squared 0.3753 0.4274 0.4898 0.4480
Breusch-Pagan test:
chi2(6) = 1721.411 ( 0.00)
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level ** 5% level *** 1% level
Standard errors in par.
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• Bilateral migration data as migration ﬂows by gender (S
i,j
t,g,h) and migrants’ diaspo-
ras (D
i,j
t−1) come from Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2007) dataset as described in
section 3. These data are available for 1990 and 2000 and concern 195 countries of
orign and 30 countries of destination. The stock of human capital is measured as
the proportion of individuals aged 25 and more with tertiary education.
• Data on geographical distance (ldist) between country i and country j are from
CEPII (Clair, Gaullier, Mayer and Zignago, 2004)
• Dummies concerning colonial (colony) and linguistic (comlang oﬀ)links are from
CEPII (Clair, Gaullier, Mayer and Zignago, 2004)
• The dummy on Shengen agreement concerns the group of twenty-ﬁve European
countries which have abolished all border controls between each other after June
the 14th 1985.
• Data on guest workers programs rely upon authors’calculation following Bohning,
1974; Castles, 1986; Basok, 2000; Martin, 2003; McDowell, 2003; Ruhs and Martin,
2008
• Bilateral migration stocks in 1960 are from the World Bank
• Data on female suﬀrage have been collected by the authors following the Women in
Parliament Database compiled by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and available on
the Inter-Parliamentary Union Statistical Archive Web site
• Data for democracy are from Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. (2003).
‘ Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002.’ Policy Research
Working Paper 3106. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
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